Post by SoulTrainOz on Jul 12, 2006 4:24:59 GMT -5
Penalty Phase in Capital Case
A potential juror in a death penalty case cannot be stricken solely
because she expressed opposition to capital punishment, but instead must be asked "follow-up questions" about her "willingness and ability to follow the law," the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.
In its 25-page unpublished opinion in Stevens v. Horn, a unanimous 3-judge panel concluded that Andre Stevens "was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury" because a Beaver County judge had removed a juror "on the sole basis of her statement that she opposed capital punishment."
Stevens was convicted in 1993 on 2 1st-degree murder charges for killing his estranged wife, Brenda Jo Stevens, and Michael Love, an off-duty police officer, after he saw them dancing in a bar.
In a nonjury trial, Stevens admitted to the shootings, but claimed he suffered from diminished mental capacity. After he was convicted by the judge, a jury was empanelled to decide his sentence, and it voted to impose death.
Now the 3rd Circuit has rejected Stevens' claim that the guilt phase of his trial was unfair because his lawyer failed to provide critical information to the prosecution's psychiatric experts.
But the court upheld a decision by U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the Western District of Pennsylvania that granted Stevens a new trial of the penalty phase due to a flaw in the jury-selection process.
Writing for the court, U.S. Circuit Judge Franklin S. Van Antwerpen found that Stevens cannot possibly show that his lawyer was ineffective during the nonjury phase of the trial because "the evidence that Stevens formed, and acted upon, the specific intent to kill was too strong."
Van Antwerpen found that Stevens "did not simply erupt into violence when he saw his wife and Love dancing at a bar. Instead, he went to his vehicle, located his weapon underneath a seat, and thingyed it 3 times. He re-entered the bar, pulled the gun from underneath his coat, pointed the weapon at the ceiling and then lowered it. He waited until Brenda Jo and Love finished dancing. These events evince a real deliberateness, and -- significantly -- they indicate that Stevens acted after having a moment to reflect."
The evidence, Van Antwerpen said, showed that when his estranged wife and Love had finished their dance, Stevens "quickly approached Brenda Jo and shot her in close range in the back of the head," and then turned to Love, whose arms were in the air, and shot him several times, with "the last shot being an intentional shot at the man's groin."
Stevens then focused again on his wife and shot her lifeless body, intentionally aiming at her head.
Van Antwerpen found that, due to the "overwhelming evidence of
deliberateness and purposefulness," Stevens could not show there was a reasonable probability that he would have been found not guilty if he had been able to present better testimony from psychiatric experts.
"The evidence of his own crime, including the evidence he gave at the guilt phase, betray his claim that he acted without any specific intent to kill," Van Antwerpen wrote.
"Even a diminished capacity defense that was fully supplemented by expert testimony would have been fatally undermined by the evidence, inherent in the events of the murders, that Stevens acted with the specific intent to kill."
But Van Antwerpen found that Stevens' death sentence must be overturned because the trial judge's decision to strike juror Nancy Hartling due to her single answer violated the U.S. Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Withersthingy v. Illinois.
"The trial judge never followed up on Hartling's initial statement that she opposed capital punishment. Under Withersthingy and its progeny ... that was error," Van Antwerpen wrote in an opinion joined by Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert and Richard L. Nygaard.
In Withersthingy, Van Antwerpen said, the Supreme Court held that a member of a jury panel may not be excused for cause simply for "voicing general objections to the death penalty or expressing conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."
Instead, Van Antwerpen said, the justices held that the "key question" is whether the potential juror would "refuse to follow the statutory scheme" controlling when the death penalty should be given.
The judge in Stevens' trial clearly violated Withersthingy, Van Antwerpen said, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's unanimous decision to the contrary was wrong because it was "not supported by anything more than speculation."
According to a transcript of the voir dire, the trial judge asked Hartling if she had "an opinion about the death penalty which would prevent you from following the court's instructions as to what penalty should be imposed?"
When Hartling answered: "I don't believe in the death penalty," the prosecutor asked that she be stricken "for cause," and the judge immediately agreed, saying "You are excused, thank you."
Van Antwerpen noted Stevens' lawyer did not object to the exclusion or seek in any way to rehabilitate Hartling.
In post-conviction hearings in the state courts, the trial judge said he had "no specific recollection" of Hartling, but that he thought there must have been something about her demeanor that was "emphatic and clearly conveyed her unwillingness to comply with the court's instructions."
That testimony satisfied the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which upheld Stevens' death sentence in an October 1999 opinion in which the justices said they "accept the statement of the trial court ... that its decision not to conduct further inquiry with respect to [Hartling] was based on its assessment of her demeanor."
But Schwab disagreed and found that the voir dire transcript showed a clear violation of Withersthingy.
Now the 3rd Circuit has agreed with Schwab, finding that "because the trial judge did not follow up Hartling's single statement with any follow-up questioning, there is simply no tangible evidence in the record to support the finding of the state courts."
Van Antwerpen found that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred by relying on the trial judge's claim that, despite his inability to remember Hartling, he must have been relying on something emphatic in her demeanor.
"Even if Hartling emphatically stated that she did not 'believe in' the death penalty, all that could reasonably be inferred is that her moral opposition to capital punishment was strongly felt," Van Antwerpen wrote.
"Supreme Court precedent makes clear, however, that the true question was whether Hartling would have been able to set aside her 'conscientious or religious scruples against' the death penalty ... and 'faithfully and impartially apply the law.'"
The fact that Hartling's opinion of capital punishment was "strongly felt," Van Antwerpen said, "says remarkably little about whether she could follow the trial court's instructions."
Stevens was represented in the appeal by attorneys Matthew C. Lawry and Billy H. Nolas of the Defender Association of Philadelphia's Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit.
Pennsylvania Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Carusone handled the appeal for the commonwealth.
(source: The Legal Intelligencer)
A potential juror in a death penalty case cannot be stricken solely
because she expressed opposition to capital punishment, but instead must be asked "follow-up questions" about her "willingness and ability to follow the law," the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.
In its 25-page unpublished opinion in Stevens v. Horn, a unanimous 3-judge panel concluded that Andre Stevens "was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury" because a Beaver County judge had removed a juror "on the sole basis of her statement that she opposed capital punishment."
Stevens was convicted in 1993 on 2 1st-degree murder charges for killing his estranged wife, Brenda Jo Stevens, and Michael Love, an off-duty police officer, after he saw them dancing in a bar.
In a nonjury trial, Stevens admitted to the shootings, but claimed he suffered from diminished mental capacity. After he was convicted by the judge, a jury was empanelled to decide his sentence, and it voted to impose death.
Now the 3rd Circuit has rejected Stevens' claim that the guilt phase of his trial was unfair because his lawyer failed to provide critical information to the prosecution's psychiatric experts.
But the court upheld a decision by U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the Western District of Pennsylvania that granted Stevens a new trial of the penalty phase due to a flaw in the jury-selection process.
Writing for the court, U.S. Circuit Judge Franklin S. Van Antwerpen found that Stevens cannot possibly show that his lawyer was ineffective during the nonjury phase of the trial because "the evidence that Stevens formed, and acted upon, the specific intent to kill was too strong."
Van Antwerpen found that Stevens "did not simply erupt into violence when he saw his wife and Love dancing at a bar. Instead, he went to his vehicle, located his weapon underneath a seat, and thingyed it 3 times. He re-entered the bar, pulled the gun from underneath his coat, pointed the weapon at the ceiling and then lowered it. He waited until Brenda Jo and Love finished dancing. These events evince a real deliberateness, and -- significantly -- they indicate that Stevens acted after having a moment to reflect."
The evidence, Van Antwerpen said, showed that when his estranged wife and Love had finished their dance, Stevens "quickly approached Brenda Jo and shot her in close range in the back of the head," and then turned to Love, whose arms were in the air, and shot him several times, with "the last shot being an intentional shot at the man's groin."
Stevens then focused again on his wife and shot her lifeless body, intentionally aiming at her head.
Van Antwerpen found that, due to the "overwhelming evidence of
deliberateness and purposefulness," Stevens could not show there was a reasonable probability that he would have been found not guilty if he had been able to present better testimony from psychiatric experts.
"The evidence of his own crime, including the evidence he gave at the guilt phase, betray his claim that he acted without any specific intent to kill," Van Antwerpen wrote.
"Even a diminished capacity defense that was fully supplemented by expert testimony would have been fatally undermined by the evidence, inherent in the events of the murders, that Stevens acted with the specific intent to kill."
But Van Antwerpen found that Stevens' death sentence must be overturned because the trial judge's decision to strike juror Nancy Hartling due to her single answer violated the U.S. Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Withersthingy v. Illinois.
"The trial judge never followed up on Hartling's initial statement that she opposed capital punishment. Under Withersthingy and its progeny ... that was error," Van Antwerpen wrote in an opinion joined by Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert and Richard L. Nygaard.
In Withersthingy, Van Antwerpen said, the Supreme Court held that a member of a jury panel may not be excused for cause simply for "voicing general objections to the death penalty or expressing conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."
Instead, Van Antwerpen said, the justices held that the "key question" is whether the potential juror would "refuse to follow the statutory scheme" controlling when the death penalty should be given.
The judge in Stevens' trial clearly violated Withersthingy, Van Antwerpen said, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's unanimous decision to the contrary was wrong because it was "not supported by anything more than speculation."
According to a transcript of the voir dire, the trial judge asked Hartling if she had "an opinion about the death penalty which would prevent you from following the court's instructions as to what penalty should be imposed?"
When Hartling answered: "I don't believe in the death penalty," the prosecutor asked that she be stricken "for cause," and the judge immediately agreed, saying "You are excused, thank you."
Van Antwerpen noted Stevens' lawyer did not object to the exclusion or seek in any way to rehabilitate Hartling.
In post-conviction hearings in the state courts, the trial judge said he had "no specific recollection" of Hartling, but that he thought there must have been something about her demeanor that was "emphatic and clearly conveyed her unwillingness to comply with the court's instructions."
That testimony satisfied the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which upheld Stevens' death sentence in an October 1999 opinion in which the justices said they "accept the statement of the trial court ... that its decision not to conduct further inquiry with respect to [Hartling] was based on its assessment of her demeanor."
But Schwab disagreed and found that the voir dire transcript showed a clear violation of Withersthingy.
Now the 3rd Circuit has agreed with Schwab, finding that "because the trial judge did not follow up Hartling's single statement with any follow-up questioning, there is simply no tangible evidence in the record to support the finding of the state courts."
Van Antwerpen found that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred by relying on the trial judge's claim that, despite his inability to remember Hartling, he must have been relying on something emphatic in her demeanor.
"Even if Hartling emphatically stated that she did not 'believe in' the death penalty, all that could reasonably be inferred is that her moral opposition to capital punishment was strongly felt," Van Antwerpen wrote.
"Supreme Court precedent makes clear, however, that the true question was whether Hartling would have been able to set aside her 'conscientious or religious scruples against' the death penalty ... and 'faithfully and impartially apply the law.'"
The fact that Hartling's opinion of capital punishment was "strongly felt," Van Antwerpen said, "says remarkably little about whether she could follow the trial court's instructions."
Stevens was represented in the appeal by attorneys Matthew C. Lawry and Billy H. Nolas of the Defender Association of Philadelphia's Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit.
Pennsylvania Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Carusone handled the appeal for the commonwealth.
(source: The Legal Intelligencer)